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Nowhere in the world does the past bear as much relevance to the present as in Northeast Asia, 
where archaeology is employed for nationalistic and political purposes, to construct national 
identities, build state legitimacy, and even press territorial claims. Korea presents a unique case 
study in understanding the intersection of nationalism, politics, and archaeology in a world of  
nation-states, not only for the high level of historical consciousness that permeates Korean society, 
but also the division of the nation into two states. Each state, North and South, has used the past to 
serve the present in different ways, despite having fundamentally similar aims: to assert the 
cultural individuality and historical independence of Korea from ideological and often military 
aggression from its larger neighbors, China and Japan. This paper aims to explore the motivations 
and consequences of nationalistic archaeology in Korea by examining its colonial Japanese roots the 
heavy influence this has had on the development of postcolonial Korean archaeology. Further, the 
case study of the Dangun myth—the origin myth of the Korean people—and its modern co-option is 
analyzed to explore the reasons why memories of the distant past are so integral to modern Korean 
identity. In closing, the paper considers how nationalistic archaeology and politics in Northeast Asia 
are colliding and will continue to collide in the twenty-first century present, through a brief 





 Korea is a nation with a resplendent history and time immemorial traditions; those familiar 
will immediately recognize the language of the preceding statement as borrowed from the opening 
line of the constitution of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). Indeed, Korea is perceived, 
together with Japan, to be one of the most historically homogeneous countries in the world. In the 
past, however, Northeast Asia was a place of regular migrations and constantly shifting political 
boundaries. The fact is that several historical states in the region straddled the present-day border 
between China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea), such that it 
becomes difficult to ascertain, at least on territorial terms, whether these kingdoms were Korean or 
Chinese.2 Moreover, it is becoming increasingly possible to link Korea and Japan in similar fashion, 
although, for reasons that will be made abundantly clear, suggestions of this variety are generally 
unpopular in both nations. 
 Given the interconnectedness of Northeast Asia in the past, it is not surprising that the 
archaeology of any one modern nation in the region informs not only its own history but that of the 
entire region. As such, Korean history and archaeology is inseparable from that of China and Japan 
(Portal 2000: 23); this is a critical point to bear in mind. However, the political climate in the past 
century has been nationalistically charged to such an extent that conflicts inevitably arise when 
nation-states attempt to appropriate the past to each assert its own national identity (Nelson 2006: 
37–38). One of the aims of this paper is to consider the broader topic of the relationship between 
archaeology, nationalism, and politics through the example of nationalistic archaeology in Korea. 3 
                                                             
1 A note on Romanization: Revised Romanization is used for Korean, excepting commonly used spellings (e.g. 
Pyongyang not Pyeongyang) and authors who have Romanized their names alternately. Pīnyīn is used for 
Chinese (diacritic marks are generally omitted for proper nouns, e.g. Lelang not Lèlàng). For the most part, 
traditional Chinese characters are used throughout except in the concluding section of the paper and, where 
appropriate, in citation. 
2 The traditional view has been that these were Korean kingdoms, but it is one that is increasingly challenged, 
by China. In order to promote political unity among its ethnic minorities, China is attempting to integrate into 
mainstream Chinese history the history of any region that falls within its modern territorial limits. I will 
discuss this issue at length further into the paper. 
3 Wailes and Zoll rightly point out that the term nationalistic archaeology is “not necessarily connected 
ideologically with either an existing or proposed nation-state” and prefer to use the term ethnic archaeology 
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Thus it is first necessary to establish a suitable framework for understanding archaeology under the 
influence of nationalism and politics. 
 Before I do so, I should like to highlight certain aspects of Korean archaeology which differ 
from Western archaeology and thus may require some elaboration. First, archaeology in East Asia, 
especially in China, has traditionally been considered a sub -discipline or “handmaid” of history, 
tasked only with augmenting historical documents ( Glover 2006; Nelson 1995: 218, 2006: 37–38). 
Increasingly, however, archaeology is recognized as a field capable of illuminating the past in its 
own right,4 particularly that distant past on which textual records are silent, which in the case of 
Korea includes and precedes the protohistoric first millennium BCE.5 Second, in his assessment of 
the state of the field in South Korea, Choi Seong-rak identified three foci of archaeological research: 
(1) to uncover buried material culture, (2) to identify the origins of Korean culture, and (3) to 
define the past territorial limits of the Korean cultural sphere. Thus the ultimate motive of 
archaeological research in Korea is—explicitly—to assert the individuality of Korean culture and to 
ascertain the independent origins of Korean ethnic identity (Choi, S. 2008: 168–69). 
 Why is the topic of ethnogenesis so central to Korean archaeology? 6 I will address this 
question in detail below, but for the moment a cursory answer will have to suffice. In part, the 
obsession with identifying Korean ethnic roots can be explained as a reaction against Japanese 
colonial scholarship, which sought to link the Korean and Japanese races together as justification 
for Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910. But there are deeper factors at play. The position of Korea 
in history as a country assailed from all sides by foreign aggression was an important contributive 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
to describe the “archaeology of cultural, or historical, identity” (Wailes and Zoll 1995: 22). In the case of 
Korea, however, ethnicity and nationality coincide to such an extent (Cummings 2005: 25) that no such 
distinction can be made. Therefore, I have opted to use the term nationalistic archaeology, which in any case 
more clearly reflects the political orientations of Korean archaeology. The term ethnonationalistic 
archaeology is also appropriate. 
4 For details on this shift, see Pai 2000: 14–16. 
5 The earliest historical documents which make reference to Korea are of Chinese authorship. The oldest of 
these is the Historical Records [Shǐjì 史記], written 109–91 BCE by Sima Qian 司馬遷. However, the Records of 
the Three Kingdoms [Sānguózhì 三國志], a third century CE text written by Chen Shou 陳壽, contains the most 
detailed account of ancient Korea (Lee, P., ed. 1993). 
6 Nelson posits that ethnogenesis may not be the most appropriate term for Korea, since some Koreans 
consider their ethnicity to be timeless; that is, it was never formed but always present (Nelson 1995: 223). 
The distinction is noteworthy but not immediately crucial for the purpose of this paper. 
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factor in shaping Korean identity (Nelson 1993: 3).7 In 1963, a time not far removed from the 
Japanese occupation which ended in 1945, scholar Lee Hi-Seung wrote, “No matter how much [a 
nation] assimilates and enjoys its imported culture, its subjectivity, or its mental sovereignty, 
should not be lessened or even lost by foreign influence… The subjectivity of a nation is built up in 
the process of creating its own culture and enjoying it”—thereby advising nascent modern Korea to 
cultivate and promote its own cultural identity (1963: 14–5). 
 The intersection of ethnicity, archaeology, and nationalistic politics is a topic which, 
although readily apparent, has only been examined critically in the past several decades (Kohl a nd 
Fawcett 1995: 4). Study of the archaeology of Korea is therefore an important addition especially 
considering Korea’s unique position in developing apart from Japan and China while still being 
fundamentally tied to the greater Northeast Asian region. Below, I will present the theoretical 
framework for exploring nationalistic archaeology, after which I will describe the colonial 
beginnings of archaeology in Korea and the development of the field following independence. The 
case study of the Dangun origin myth of Korea will be highlighted to examine the effects of colonial 
history, nationalistic politics, and ethnocentrism on archaeological practice. Lastly, I will discuss 
how these issues are active in present-day Northeast Asia, as China and Korea in particular struggle 
to claim ownership of the region’s past. 
 
 
NATIONALISTIC ARCHAEOLOGY IN CONTEXT 
  
 It has been previously argued that the nationalistic orientation of most archaeological 
traditions is not an exclusively postcolonial development but an inherent characteristic of the field 
(Kohl and Fawcett 1995; Trigger 1984, 1995). Here I am not concerned with why this is the case 
but rather with how the relationship between nationalism and archaeology is defined, principally in 
                                                             
7 In the ROK, and likely the DPRK as well, the school of nationalistic historiography [minjok sahak 민족사학] is 
dominant and according to it, the history of Korea is one of “continuous national struggle” [tujaengsa 투쟁사] 
(Pai 1994: 25–26). 
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the context of postcolonial East and Southeast Asia, although relevant examples from Europe are 
also given. In brief, archaeology in East and Southeast Asia can be said to have colonial roots. The 
earliest archaeological research conducted in the region was directed by Western scholars, whose 
colonialist stance maintained that native societies were culturally stagnant and unable to develop, 
in contrast to the vibrant imperial powers of the West (González-Ruibal 2010; Trigger 1984: 363). 
In direct response, to disprove and reverse colonialist readings of their histories, postcolonial East 
and Southeast Asian nations utilized archaeology “to labor in the service of emergent identities in 
the present” (Meskell 2007: 216). Only Thailand, alone in the region (excepting Japan) to have 
avoided colonization, was comparatively late to use archaeology as a tool for nation-building. 
Elsewhere, nationalistic archaeology materialized immediately and in full force to seek in a glorious 
past, real or imagined, suitable ideological backing for newly formed national identities (Glover 
2006). In this process, emphasis was often placed on the more recent past, as its surviving 
monuments and relics were especially potent in physically and visually linking modern nation-
states to their geographic and cultural predecessors (Trigger 1984: 360). 
 The case of Korea exhibits a number of differences to the processes outlined above. For one, 
Korean scholars, concerned with identifying Korean ethnic origins, looked primarily to its distant 
past rather than more recent history (Shim 2002: 272). An additional factor for this interest in 
prehistory was that Japanese colonial archaeology had similarly studied prehistory in order to  
validate nissen dōsoron 日鮮同祖論, the theory of shared ancestral origins of the Japanese and 
Korean races. The theory also posited that Korea was culturally backward;8 therefore, Japan was 
duty-bound to “repair” the cultural lapse of its brother country by integrating Korea into the 
superior cultural sphere of the Japanese empire (Robinson 2007: 36, 44). Understandably, Korean 
scholars after Korean independence viewed the scholarship produced during the colonial period as 
“tainted” by colonialist interpretations, and in need of correction. Even in the present-day, 
“historians and archaeologists in Korea and Japan still fight over the interpretation of the colonial 
materials as they try to unscramble this narrative in an academic climate still dominated by 
nationalistic passions” (Robinson 2007: 44–45). It is important to consider also Korea’s continuous 
                                                             
8 The so-called stagnation theory was called teitaron 停滯論 (Pai 2000: 55; Shim 2002: 271). 
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need throughout its long history to assert cultural individuality from foreign cultural influence, 
particularly that of China. Japan’s twentieth century incursions therefore represented only the 
latest event in a longstanding tradition of such foreign aggression.  
 Finally, the most salient different between Korea and most other postcolonial nations is that 
Korea was partitioned in two, North and South, after independence and remains divided to this day. 
The division resulted in the establishment of two states with quite different political systems, each 
with its own historical needs. Thus, two narratives of Korean history developed, each as legitimate 
as the other.9 By comparing the two narratives, it is possible to trace the influence of nationalism 
and politics on the reconstruction of history in Korea in the past sixty years. Several rough parallels 
to the unique political situation of Korea exist elsewhere, for instance in Taiwan and Ireland. The 
case of Taiwan, historically a part of China but now partitioned, centers on the various 
interpretations of the island’s prehistory. Traditionally, the generally accepted view has been that 
the prehistoric inhabitants of Taiwan had originally migrated from northern China. Taiwanese 
political interests have since impacted scholarship such that at present, Taiwan’s prehistoric 
peoples are more closely linked to Austronesian cultures than to the Chinese mainland (Glover 
2006: 20). 
 The case of Ireland bears uncanny similarities to that of Korea. Irish archaeology has been 
strongly influenced by the island’s historical relationship with England (Cooney 1995: 272), just as 
Korean archaeology has been shaped by the Korean Peninsula’s historical relationship with Japan. 
In other words, both Ireland and Korea once came under the domination not of geographically 
distant and historically removed imperial powers, but of neighbors with whom they share 
intimately linked pasts. As in Korea, questions of ethnicity entered the picture in Ireland: The Home 
Rule movement and the rise of nationalist sentiment in the nineteenth century were marked in part 
by the imagining of a glorious Irish past with “an ethnically pure culture of Celtic origins.” These 
desires came to the forefront in the aftermath of the Irish revolutionary period in the 1910s–1920s, 
                                                             
9 I am referring here to legitimacy, not accuracy. The DPRK’s account of Korean history is normally 
disregarded by the West on grounds of the lack of scientific basis in North Korean archaeological research 
and its largely subjective interpretations. It is nonetheless legitimate to the DPRK government and, one must 
assume, the North Korean people as well. 
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when social memory was shaped through the removal of British imperial symbols from Ireland—
statuary of British monarchs, for example (Woodman 1995: 280–82). At present, the political 
division of Ireland has fostered a climate in which scholars of both the Republic of Ireland and 
Northern Ireland have been hesitant to engage in discussions on the topic of the relationship 
between archaeology and politics on that island (Cooney 1995: 272). 
 The past is indeed a potent tool for the present. Meskell notes that the past can be 
“reworked and reinterpreted, multiply claimed, appropriated, erased, or capitalized upon” (2012: 
233), which certainly has been the case in Korea, where the past has been heavily manipulated in 
the process of postcolonial nation-building and identity-construction. But as detailed above, Korean 
archaeology exhibits a number of interesting differences in relation to postcolonial archaeology in 
other East and Southeast Asian nations, which may be summarized as such: (1) the origins of 
Korean archaeology in Japanese colonial scholarship, and (2) the division of Korea into two states 
following independence operating under radically different political systems. I will now discuss 
these points in sequence. 
 
 
COLONIAL ORIGINS OF KOREAN ARCHAEOLOGY 
 
 Archaeology in Korea began with imperial Japan’s interest in the Korean past, an interest 
that was in numerous ways politically motivated. In this brief outline of Japanese archaeological 
research in Korea during the colonial period, I will present evidence for the argument that Japanese 
colonial archaeology had a lasting influence on the development of postcolonial Korean archaeology 
(made subsequently). Korean media and academia are, on the whole, extremely critical of Japanese 
colonial scholarship. According to the prevailing disposition, Japanese colonial scholarship was 
merely a façade behind which Korean antiques were plundered by the Japanese. Moreover, the 
purpose of Japanese colonial research was to justify Japan’s interventions in Korean affairs in the 
early twentieth century. While these are warranted views, the reality is that there were aspects of 
Japanese colonial scholarship that were beneficial to Korea in the long-term, a fact that is, 
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understandably, infrequently discussed. It is to these often neglected aspects of Japanese colonial 
scholarship I first turn my attention. 
 Prior to Japanese colonial rule, Joseon Korea under the Yi Dynasty (1392–1897 CE) did not 
focus on protecting cultural relics and monuments. Early on, Japanese archaeologists “noted this 
neglect… and constantly deplored the fact that with each passing day, precious monuments were 
being lost” (Pai 1994: 29). In this context, it is perhaps unsurprising that in 1916, Japan enacted the 
first cultural property protection laws in Korea,10 a full three years before similar legislation was 
introduced in Japan itself. As a result, the Colonial Governor-General Committee for the 
Investigation of Ancient Remains and Relics was established and, in short, enforced the registration, 
protection, and maintenance of hundreds of historical sites in Korea (Pai 1994: 32–33, 2010: 95, 
97–99). Furthermore, the Japanese Governor-General of Korea (GGK) was the first to designate 
select Korean artifacts and sites as National Treasures. At the time this was a political move by 
which Japan demonstrated its authority and self-professed superiority over Korea, because only 
Japanese scholars and bureaucrats could decide what qualified as National Treasures, and thus 
what was representative of Korean culture and history (Pai 1994: 37–38). Ironically, the notion of 
National Treasures persisted after the colonial period; at present in the ROK, they are designated by 
the Office of Cultural Properties (Nelson 2006: 42), and a consistently controversial topic in the 
South Korea has been that of cultural heritage repatriation.11 
The benefits that accompanied Japanese colonial scholarship were clearly significant in the 
long-term. It is worth noting that Japanese colonial scholarship itself was meticulous and detailed. 
Few criticize its quality, and it was regarded as one of the best examples of accurate, organized, and 
well-published research in its time (Arimitsu 1966; Nelson 2006: 46; Pai 1994, 2010: 99; contra  
Kim, C. 2000). For instance, the groundbreaking works of Torri Ryuzo on identifying the Neolithic 
cultures of the Korean Peninsula was highly influential in subsequent Japanese and South Korean 
                                                             
10 This law was called the Regulations on the Preservation of Ancient Sites and Relics of Chōsen [Koseki oyobi 
ibutsu bozon kitei]. It was followed, after independence, by the Cultural Properties Preservation Act (1962) in 
South Korea (Pai 2000: 4–5). 
11 The topic of cultural heritage repatriation has clear political ramifications and is very relevant to this paper, 
but unfortunately beyond its scope. For further reading, see Chŏng 2005; Thompson 2013. 
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scholarship. Pioneering Japanese research on Lelang Commandery 12 was similarly seminal for 
future studies (Arimitsu 1966: 76–77).13 The problem, as ever, was in the colonialist bias of 
interpretation and publication. Not only did Japan exclude local scholars from participating in 
research projects and provide little in the ways of training, Japanese research was not published in 
Korean (Nelson 2006: 41–42). 
The colonialist interpretations of Japanese colonial scholarship are readily apparent. The 
principle theory that guided Japanese colonial scholarship, particularly archaeological research, 
was nissen dōsoron (see above), to which there were four components: (1) the Japanese and 
Koreans share common racial ancestry; 14 (2) Japanese people once ruled part of the Korean 
Peninsula, ca. 300–600 CE; (3) Korean civilization developed by feeding on China’s more advanced 
culture; (4) Korean culture and civilization is less advanced than that of China and Japan (Pai 1994: 
39). Under this theory, Japan saw it as its duty to bring Korea under the imperial umbrella of Japan, 
thereby helping Korea out of its cultural backwardness—the justification for the colonization of 
Korea (Pai 1994: 40; Nelson 2006: 38–41). It must have been galling for Koreans to swallow this 
idea. In the present-day, strong anti-Japanese rhetoric is still prevalent in South Korea. Japan’s 
colonial policies are often described as the “politics of annihilation/massacre of Korean culture  
identity” [minjok malsal jeongchaek 민족말살정책], and Japanese colonial scholarship is described 
as the “misuse/conspiracy of imperial Japanese scholarship” [ilje oyong hakja 일제오용학자] (Pai 
1994: 28, 41, 2010: 1). 
An example that illustrates the use of nissen dōsoron for political aims is the controversy 
surrounding the Stele of King Gwanggaeto [gwanggaetowangbi 광개토왕비], found in 1882 at Ji’an, 
Jilin Province, an early capital of the Goguryeo kingdom (37 BCE–668 CE). The stele, which bears an 
inscription composed of 1,775 Chinese characters, is over six meters in height and dates to 414 CE.  
                                                             
12 Lelang Commandery (108 BCE–313 CE), established in the vicinity of modern Pyongyang, was one of four 
commanderies to be established in or near the Korean Peninsula by the Han Dynasty of China.  
13 See Arimitsu 1966 for details on other notable Japanese colonial scholars and their works (cf. Pai 2000, 
chapter two). 
14 This idea, Man-Sen shi 滿鲜史, extended to Manchuria, another target of Japanese imperialism; Japanese 
scholars attempted to ethnically link both Manchus and Koreans to the Japanese (Nelson 2006: 38–41; Shim 
2002: 271).  
9 
 
Weighing almost forty tons, it is an imposing monument, at present displayed in Ji’an (Kang, H. 
2001: 28). Studies by Japanese scholars quickly concluded that the inscription confirmed accounts 
in the eighth century CE text Chronicles of Japan [Nihon Shoki 日本書紀], according to which a 
Japanese state ruled part of southern Korea ca. 300–600 CE (Nelson 2006: 47). 15 The find was 
rather convenient for the Japanese, who in the late nineteenth century were beginning to push into 
Asia with Korea as their foothold on the continent; here was a text bearing a “historical” precedent! 
(Yŏn 2006: 154).  
The Korean response to the Japanese reading of the stele was highly critical. Both North and 
South Korean scholars have since argued that the partially defaced inscriptions make multiple 
interpretations possible. Some scholars even claimed that the Japanese had deliberately damaged 
the stele upon discovering it in order to make possible a reading that aligned with imperial Japan’s 
political agendas (Portal 2005: 119). The first of such claims were made in 1972 but research since 
has established that the stele was probably not deliberately damaged, though it was possibly 
harmed during conservation work after rubbings of the initial inscription had been made (Yŏn 
2006: 155). Meanwhile, in July 2012, what is thought to be another Goguryeo stele was found near 
Ji’an in China. Preliminary reports were only released on January 4, 2013, and the delay has 
prompted skeptical reception to the discovery in South Korea.16 Suggestions have been made on the 
Korean side of the debate that the stele represents China’s latest attempt to incorporate Goguryeo 
history into mainstream Chinese history (see below). Some South Korean media outlets have since 
dubbed the stele “the second Gwanggaeto stele.”17 
                                                             
15 The stele itself identifies a group called the Wa 倭, an old Chinese name for the people that once occupied 
the western/southern part of the Japanese archipelago. Colonial Japanese scholars attributed to this group 
the state of Mimana, which they equated with the Gaya confederation (42–562 CE), considered one of Korea’s 
earliest states (Nelson 1995: 222). For a philological study of the stele inscription, see Beack 2005. 
16 For this report, see, “Jílín Jí'ān xīn ji{n Gāogōulì shíbēi: cūnmín fāxi{n bìng b{og{o wénwù bùmén  吉林集安
新见高句丽石碑:村民发现并报告文物部门 [Goguryeo Stele Newly Discovered in Jilin, Ji’an: Villagers Report 
Discovery to the Cultural Relics Department],” Zhōngguó wénwù xìnxī wǎng 中国文物信息网 [Chinese 
Cultural Relics News Network], January 4, 2013, [URL]. 
17 Ban, Seon-hye, “Sinbalgyeon ‘Ji’an Goguryeobi’, Gwanggaetowang-i saegin choegobi 新발견 ‘지안 고구려비’, 
광개토왕이 새긴 최고비 [Newly Discovered Ji’an Goguryeo Stele, Greatest Stele Inscribed by King 
Gwanggaeto],” 뉴스천지, February 1, 2013, [URL]; Kim, Tong-hyung. “Stone to stoke old Goguryeo rivalry,” 
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All four components of nissen dōsoron laid out by Pai are illustrated by the controversy of 
the Gwanggaeto stele. Connecting this case to broader patterns of Japanese archaeological research 
in Korea is the fact that Japan’s most prominent excavations were Silla tombs (57 BCE–935 CE), 
Lelang tombs, and Goguryeo tombs—all early states. Data from these excavations were interpreted 
accordingly in order to substantiate the idea that Korean and Japanese ethnic roots were linked. 
Altogether, Japan conducted four decades of archaeological research in Korea (see Pai 2010: 94–96 
for a table listing key events for this period), starting with the first archaeological survey of the 
Korean Peninsula in 1901. By 1937, the GGK completed the publication of the History of Korea 
[Chōsenshi 朝鮮史] in 37 volumes, which was “an elaborate justification of colonial rule” (Robinson 
2007: 44–45). Despite such obviously political uses of scholarship and the lack of conscious effort 
on Japan’s part to create a legacy of archaeological research in Korea, the Japanese did conduct 
well-received research (at the time, at any rate) which continues, albeit necessarily, to be the basis 
of much Korean scholarship on the topic of Korea’s earliest states. Japan also introduced laws to 
protect cultural heritage sites and artifacts in Korea before the same was done in Japan itself. It is 
therefore entirely possible, if not particularly popular, to attribute to Japanese colonial scholarship 
the high priority placed on the study and protection of cultural heritage in Korea today. 
 
 
KOREAN ARCHAEOLOGY SINCE 1945 
 
 Korea’s independence from Japan in 1945 enabled Korean archaeologists to take charge in 
leading the development of postcolonial Korean archaeology, which can be characterized in two 
ways. The first is the lasting influence of Japanese colonial archaeology on Korean archaeology, 
which is a two-sided issue: Although Korean scholarship was markedly anti-Japanese and greatly 
inspired by the desire and need to refute the interpretations of Japanese scholarship, it nonetheless 
relied on the precedent of Japanese research, which was the only framework available and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Korea Times, April 16, 2013, [URL]; Shim, S., “Koguryo stele discovered in China,” Yonhap News Agency, 
January 16, 2013, [URL]. 
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accessible. The second characterization concerns the division of Korea. The DPRK and the ROK 
operated under different ideologies and as such it was necessary to utilize the past in different ways 
to legitimate the state. It is argued here, however, that despite the divergences, the archaeology of 
North Korea and that of South Korea are fundamentally alike in their aims to assert a longstanding 
tradition of Korean individuality and a glorious, timeless Korean past.18 
 To begin with the effects of Japanese colonial research in postcolonial Korea, I highlight 
Pai’s argument that “the contemporary Korean national historical framework advocating racial 
purity, the permanent nature of racial characteristic, and the historical destiny of the nation is 
firmly entrenched in early twentieth-century Japanese colonial ideologies” (1994: 28). I have 
shown above through such examples as the nissen dōsoron theory and the Gwanggaeto stele  
controversy that Japan justified the colonization of Korea by claiming an alleged precedent for 
Japanese presence in the Korean Peninsula and by linking together the origins of the Japanese and 
Korean peoples. In order for Korean scholars to legitimate Korea’s newly gained political 
independence, they needed to assert Korea’s cultural individuality, which was accomplished by 
presenting an account of Korean prehistory and ethnic origins that invalidated the one offered by 
Japanese colonial scholarship. Questions not simply of the content of postcolonial research but also 
of methodology arose. It was only natural that Korean scholars should co-opt the framework of 
Japanese research to use it as a tool against Japanese colonial interpretations of the Korean past—it 
was necessary for Korean scholars to examine the same body of evidence. The first archaeological 
excavation after independence was the 1946 excavation of Silla sites in Gyeongju, where Japanese 
archaeologists had previously worked.  
 The largely indigenous development of Korean archaeology, keeping with the theme of 
independence and individuality, was itself a source of pride to Korean archaeologists (Nelson 1993: 
3). However, despite South Korean archaeologists’ “fierce determination to do archaeology without 
foreign influence,” Western scholars were not actively discouraged from engaging with South 
                                                             
18 In this section, greater focus is placed on analyzing the DPRK’s use of the past for national identity 
construction for the reason that, coming from a South Korean background myself, it is more difficult to 
objectively discern this relationship as it is manifest in the ROK (which, perhaps, in itself informs the degrees 
to which nationalistic interests are prevalent in South Korean archaeology). 
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Korean academia; only a few were ever interested in doing so (Nelson 2006: 50 –51). In North 
Korea, the majority of foreign scholarly interaction was with the Soviet Union, due to the DPRK’s 
negative disposition towards the West, particularly the United States. Although limited access to 
North Korean publications hinders our understanding of Soviet-DPRK scholarly exchange, it is 
known at least that Marxist theory was rather influential in North Korean academia and by 
extension perhaps, Soviet archaeological methodology as well (Nelson 2006: 48 –49). The language 
and terminology employed by North Korean publications, for example, is decidedly Marxist in 
character (Nelson 1993: 2, 2006: 37, 43).19 
 In South Korea, where the government perceived its “worldwide status to be partly 
dependent on the longevity of indigenous political systems” (Barnes 2001: 82–83),20 historians and 
archaeologists unsurprisingly exercised a great deal of influence, setting school curricula at all 
levels, curating museums, managing cultural heritage resources, and even having a say in selecting 
national holidays—all with the ultimate aim of forging national solidarity (Pai 1994: 26). In 1961, 
the first Department of Archaeology and Anthropology was founded at Seoul National University 
and the decades following marked an increase in salvage excavations associated with the rapid 
modernization of South Korea (Kim, W. 1983: 3; Nelson 2006: 51). Investment in cultural heritage 
property retrieval and restoration continued throughout the 1970s and the Korean Archaeological 
Society [Hanguk Gogohakhoe 한국고고학회] was established in 1976. By that time, the amount of 
data generated far surpassed the speed at which archaeologists could process it (Choi, S. 2008: 
163–64). The sum total of archaeological excavations—academic, rescue, and otherwise—in South 
Korea numbered 107 in 1991; in 2006, the number had jumped to 1,300 (Shoda 2008: 203). South 
Korean archaeology had achieved great progress in a short amount of time.21 
                                                             
19 Marxist influence on archaeology was not unique to the DPRK. For a discussion on Marxist influence on 
postwar Japanese archaeology, see Fawcett 1995: 234–36 and Mizoguchi 2010: 87–89; on China, see Tong 
1995. 
20 See Gries 2005: 9–10 for a discussion on the usage of the past for political aims by Park Chung Hee (1963–
1979), one of South Korea’s most influential leaders in its formative period. 
21 For further reading on the most influential scholars and their articles during the first decades of Korean 
archaeology post-1945, see Kim, C. 2000: 11 ff. See Nelson 1987 for a concise article on the development of 
early Korean archaeology. 
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 It was inevitable that in time, South Korean archaeological scholarship would come head-to-
head with its contemporary Japanese counterpart. Gaya and Silla studies increasingly began to 
incorporate data from the western Japanese archipelago; even a quick search reveals a large 
number of studies connecting these early Korean states to early Japan. For a time, Japanese scholars 
were on the defensive from the attempts of South Korean archaeologists to “correct” some of what 
they perceived as the wrongs of Japanese colonial scholarship by linking early Japan to early Korea, 
only in reverse order: Chinese cultural influence was transmitted to Korea and subsequently spread 
to Japan. The prevailing train of thought in postwar Japan was Nihonbunkaron (also Bunkaron,  
Nihonron), “discussions of the Japanese,” which boomed in the 1970s and advocated the originality 
of Japanese ethnicity and nationality, despite the ease with which the notion that Japanese 
civilization was entirely original to the archipelago could be challenged (Fawcett 1995: 241–42).22 
More recently, however, both South Korean and Japanese scholars are contributing to the lively 
discussion on the early first millennium CE interaction between Korea and Japan (Nelson 2006: 48), 
although politico-historical tensions still remain. In 1995, for instance, the headquarters of the GGK 
in Seoul, which, for practical reasons served as the temporary National Museum building in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, was ceremonially dismantled to commemorate the fiftieth year of Korean 
independence from Japan (Pai 2000: 237–43).23 
 In North Korea, the past was appropriated for overtly propagandistic purposes (Lankov 
2007: 43). The geographic focus of much archaeological research, which had to generate ideological 
backing for the DPRK government, was Pyongyang. The government sought to firmly establish 
Pyongyang as the oldest center of Korean civilization (Im 1992: 237): “North Korean official 
                                                             
22 Cummings suggests that one reason archaeologists are still forbidden from studying the ancient tombs of 
Japan by the Imperial House is that the tombs could potentially reveal a connection to Korean tombs, which 
are well-studied; such evidence would undermine the independent origins theory of the Japanese imperial 
line (2005: 33). The ban on studying Japanese royal tombs dates back to 1874 and the Meiji government, and 
was one reason Japanese archaeologists began seeking work elsewhere and found the perfect candidate in 
Korea (Pai 2000: 94, 103). In fact, Japanese colonial archaeology conducted in Korea laid the basis for much 
archaeological research in postwar Japan (Arimitsu 1966: 75). For further reading, see Tsude 1995. 
23 South Korea’s president at the time, Kim Young-sam, also had a vested political interest in the ceremony. 
The destruction of the GGK building symbolized a new start and a new era, in which the painful memories of 
the Japanese occupation as well as the rough decades of military dictatorship preceding his presidency, could 
be laid to rest (Pai 2000: 239). 
14 
 
historians have spent an impressive amount of ink… to prove that Pyongyang has always been the 
center of Korean polity” (Lankov 2007: 77). By elevating the status of Pyongyang, the DPRK not 
only gained prestige but could suggest that it was more legitimate than the ROK as the state of the 
Korean people.24 Although a lack of accessible information makes it difficult to present a survey of 
North Korean archaeological projects, it appears that as of 1992, a total of at least 100 
archaeological sites were excavated and published. The publication history is uneven: the 1960s 
and 1980s were the most productive years, but there seems to have been a decline in the interim 
decade (Im 1992: 237).25 
 A useful lens from which to examine the development of archaeology in the DPRK is the 
simultaneous advance of juche 주체, or self-reliance, philosophy since the mid-1950s (Choi, M. 2008: 
68). Because juche advocated North Korea’s economic and political independence from foreign 
countries, it was important that North Korea’s historical independence be demonstrated to the 
world for the added ideological backing this could generate. In 1958, Kim Il-sung said in a speech, 
“With the help of historical remains and relics, we must clearly show the people, the new emerging 
generation in particular, the brilliant cultural tradition left by our ancestor and their patriotic spirit 
in courageously fighting back the foreign invaders” (Portal 2005: 105). Ample examples of such 
politically charged rhetoric is present in the chapter headings of the 1977 DPRK publicatio n, The 
Outline of Korean History,26 two examples of which are, “Culture of Korea in Ancient Times Sheds Its 
Brilliance on the East” and “Koguryo People’s Valorous Struggle Against Aggression” (Foreign 
Languages Publishing House 1977). 
 An illustrative example of juche-oriented archaeology is the interpretation of Lelang  
Commandery sites by North Korean scholars,27 who argue that Lelang was located further north 
beyond the present-day borders of the DPRK or deny its existence altogether. The case of Lelang 
                                                             
24 In fact, Seoul remained the official capital of North Korea until 1972 (Lankov 2007: 80). 
25 For a bibliography of North Korean archaeology compiled by South Korean scholars, see Yi, Lee, and Shin 
1989. 
26 The only North Korean publications I have been able to access are two Foreign Languages Publishing House 
volumes (see bibliography). Some caution must be exercised when analyzing texts published by the Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, as these are intended for foreign audiences (but also, perhaps, domestic 
audiences as well). 
27 For a detailed study of Lelang, see Pai 2000. 
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also demonstrates the far-reaching influence of Japanese colonial scholarship on subsequent 
Korean archaeology. Lelang sites were excavated by Japanese scholars from 1913. From the Korean 
point-of-view, Japan’s Lelang research must have seemed to be yet another manifestation of Japan’s 
perpetual debasement of Korean culture as inferior to Chinese and Japanese culture. Therefore, in 
advancing the contradictory interpretation that Lelang sites and artifacts—clearly Chinese—in 
Korea were merely imports rather than the possessions of the Chinese ruling elite of Lelang, North 
Korean scholars assert Korean individuality and independence not only from China but 
simultaneously from Japan as well. One scholar, Hong Ki-mun, even claimed that the Lelang artifacts 
uncovered by Japanese scholars were fabrications sold to the Japanese; this claim has since been 
refuted (Pai 1994: 35). A parallel to such nationalistically and politically oriented archaeology is 
evident in Vietnam, whose historical resistance to Chinese cultural influence is asserted by the 
interpretation of Chinese material culture found in Vietnam as imports, thereby suggesting a 
commercial relationship rather than outright Sinicization (Glover 2006: 26). To acknowledge 
openly that China played a role in shaping Vietnamese culture would be to admit, by implication, 
that China had fostered a more advanced culture (Glover 2006: 26; Trigger 1984: 359–60). The past, 
according to Glover, “is a moral force in Vietnam, unequalled anywhere in the world except perhaps 
in Korea” (Glover 2006: 26).28 
 One might ask why South Korean archaeologists accept Lelang’s localization to  the area of 
Pyongyang when their northern counterparts do not; in fact, the rejection of Lelang’s localization by 
North Korean scholars has been criticized by South Korean scholars as nonsense with no basis in 
logic (Im 1992: 240; Nelson 1995: 221). The reason perhaps is that the latter have preferred to 
temper their nationalistic interpretations of the past by grounding them in more scientific 
foundations in order to appeal to global academia, while in the North such scientific basis and an 
attempt at more subjective interpretations have been sacrificed to make possible readings of 
                                                             
28 The concerns of territorially smaller nations under the sphere of influence of larger neighbors with 
asserting cultural individuality is also seen in the example of Portugal, which since the nineteenth century 
exhibited the same behavior against Spain (Oliveira and Jorge 1995: 255). 
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history that align perfectly with the government’s juche ideology.29 This divergence is evident to 
some extent in the methodologies of North and South Korean archaeology: South Korean scholars 
place finds within chronological contexts derived from scientific techniques, while North Korean 
scholars tend to use the more imprecise method of object typology and stratigraphy to deliver 
general dates that more ably support their hypotheses (Im 1992: 239). A more straightforward 
difference is that North Korea emphasizes Goguryeo and Goryeo history (these historical states 
were centered in the North), while the ROK emphasizes United Silla (Lankov 2007: 44; Portal 2005: 
105–6, 113–15). The two Koreas’ narratives of prehistory diverge as well: DPRK scholars claim that 
the oldest Paleolithic cave sites in the north are half a million years old, but ROK scholars reject the 
claim (Foreign Languages Publishing House 1977: 4; Im 1992: 239; Nelson 2006: 43).  
 Ultimately, however, these divergent interpretations do not represent a significant conflict 
between North and South Korean archaeological scholarship. Portal notes that Kim Il-sung’s focus 
on “the brilliant cultural tradition of Korea, a pure and homogeneous race unsullied by foreign 
influence, is quite similar to South Korean archaeologists’ preoccupation with Korean ethnicity” 
(2005: 105). Indeed, the aims of archaeology in the two countries are fundamentally rooted in the 
response to Japanese colonial archaeology and a desire to promote the distinctiveness of Korea 
from China and Japan (Nelson 2006: 37). What is more revealing is the lack of exchange between 
North and South Korean scholars. North Korean publications, few in number to begin with, cannot 
be accessed without permission in the ROK (Nelson 1993: 8). Nelson notes that she herself only had 
restricted access to North Korean material during her research trip to South Korea in 1983 (2006: 
48–49). One might imagine the same is true in the North, whereby possession of South Korean 
publications could have harsh consequences if discovered. In recent years, however, scholars from 
Eastern Europe are visiting the North in greater numbers (Nelson 2006: 50), and the DPRK 
successfully applied to have a number of Goguryeo tombs named UNESCO World Heritage Sites 
(Portal 2005: 123). North Korean archaeology appears to be emerging, gradually, from isolation.  
                                                             
29 North Korean archaeologists claim that a “Daedong River culture” (Pyongyang is located on this river), 
rivals the ancient cultures of Mesopotamia and Egypt (Lankov 2007: 81; cf. Kang H. S. 2008: 24). Such claims 
have obviously been ignored by the West. For a North Korean publication on the subject see Foreign 
Languages Publishing House 2001. 
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THE DANGUN MYTH AND ANCIENT TOMBS: A CASE STUDY30 
 
 The Dangun myth—the origin myth of the Korean people—is a central constituent of the 
Korean identity. The perception of the myth by Koreans and its appropriation for political use 
illustrates the relationship between nationalism and archaeology in Korea, and also highlights the 
importance of the question of ethnogenesis in Korea. According to the myth, Hwanung descended 
from Heaven to the earth at Baekdu Mountain, where a bear and a tiger appealed to him to make 
them human. Only the bear passed Hwanung’s trial and upon her becoming a woman, Hwanung 
took her as his wife. The she-bear bore a son named Dangun, who founded Korea’s first state, 
Gojoseon, and ruled for a thousand years.31 The year 2333 BCE is considered the date on which 
Dangun founded Gojoseon and the day, October 3, is a national holiday today (Gaecheonjeol 
개천절). Thus, the often heard phrase “five-thousand years of history” is ultimately derived from 
the Dangun legend.32 
 This notion of a five-thousand year history dates back at least to the thirteenth century CE, 
where it appears in the Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms [Samguk Yusa 삼국유사 三國遺事] (Pai 
1994: 26–27).33 Although Dangun had always been a central figure for folk religions, the Yi Dynasty 
of the Joseon Kingdom (1392–1897 CE) was the first to use Dangun to legitimate their rule. In the 
process, it is believed that they simplified or “standardized” the myth from the numerous variations 
that had existed prior to the one related above. That the first Korean state founded by Dangun was 
named Gojoseon, which means Old Joseon, is no coincidence. In 1492, a temple for Dangun was 
built in Pyongyang (subsequently destroyed during the Korean War) (Cummings 2005: 24), so it 
appears that the myth was at the forefront of social consciousness even a century after it was first 
                                                             
30 For a comprehensive and detailed treatment of the Dangun myth, its historiography, role in nationalism, 
and other topics, see No, ed. 2000 (cf. Pai 2000, chapter three). 
31 For a more elaborate telling of the myth, see Nelson 1995. 
32 Dangun is not generally perceived as a real historical figure in South Korea, but this does not diminish his 
symbolic significance. The study of Dangun has spawned a sub-discipline of its own (Dangun studies), which 
has revealed the many problems one encounters when attempted to analyze the myth against ethnic history. 
For details, see Nelson 1995. 
33 On a side note, I recently observed that a line of salt in South Korea uses the slogan” ‘Five-thousand years of 
mystery” [반만년의 신비]. The notion is still prevalent and a core aspect of Korean identity. 
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appropriated by the Yi Dynasty to legitimize its power. However, Dangun faded from social memory 
in the following century, only to return in the seventeenth century when Korea faced foreign 
invasion from the Japanese and the Manchus; some believe that the earlier Mongol invasion of 
Korea in the thirteenth century marked the beginning of Koreans looking to Dangun as their ethnic 
ancestor (Suh 2000: 81–182). In the twentieth century, Japanese scholars sought to manipulate the 
Dangun myth in their pursuit to reinforce the nissen dōsoron theory. The idea that the Dangun 
legend had been introduced by the Mongols in the thirteenth century, and therefore was not 
originally Korean, was advanced. However, Korean scholars used the evidence of a number of stone 
slabs found in the Wu family shrine in China (dating to the second century CE), to prove that the 
Dangun legend predated the arrival of the Mongols in Korea (Lee 1993: 5). There is no definitive 
proof that that these paintings depict the Dangun myth, and the implications of them having been 
found in China have not been addressed (Pai 2000: 73).34 Dangun even became a religion in the face 
of Japanese intellectual assaults: anti-Japanese Korean intellectuals founded Dangungyo 단군교, or 
the religion of Dangun, in the early twentieth century (Pai 1994: 27, 2010: 266–67). 
 After independence, the Dangun myth was used to strengthen the ideological legitimacy of 
the Kim Il-sung regime of North Korea, much as it had done for the Yi Dynasty. As the story goes, 
Kim Jong-il, Kim Il-sung’s son, was born on the slopes of Baekdu Mountain, where Dangun was born 
(Nelson 2006: 50).35 In the 1980s, a log cabin was built on the mountain to mark and commemorate 
Kim Jong-il’s birthplace. This artificial connection was highly effective in creating an ideological 
basis for the regime; allegedly the cabin is one of North Korea’s most popular tourist destinations 
(Pai 1994: 27, 2010: 59).36 To further link his own lineage to the dawn of Korean history, Kim Il-
sung approved the excavation of the supposed tomb of Dangun in 1993. The People’s Daily, a North 
                                                             
34 For images and a study of the paintings, see Kim, C. 1948. 
35 Kim Jong-il was in fact born in Russia where Kim Il-sung operated a guerilla outfit against the Japanese 
during the colonial period. 
36 Another somewhat dubious claim, as domestic tourism is probably virtually non-existent in North Korea 
due to severely restricted movement within the country. 
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Korean periodical, reported the positive results on October 16, 1993.37 The interpretation of the 
find was nationalistically charged: “Koreans were the oldest (and therefore finest) people in the 
world, with one continuous line of history from the thirtieth century B.C. down to the present”  
(Cummings 2005: 24). Of course, even if the skeletal remains discovered are authentic and the 
dating accurate, it is impossible to attribute them to Dangun. In 1994, one month before his death, 
Kim Il-sung approved the reconstruction of Dangun’s tomb (Portal 2005: 106). The reconstruction 
is highly anachronistic, utilizing elements of architecture drawn from all periods of Korean history 
(Portal 2005: 106–8). It certainly is not what Dangun’s tomb would have looked like, if ever such a 
tomb existed. Of course, historical accuracy was never a priority; the tomb was meant to 
monumentalize the whole of Korean history and strengthen the political authority of the DPRK 
regime. According to the Korea Herald, a 126-member delegation from South Korea was permitted 
to visit Dangun’s tomb on the occasion of the national holiday Gaecheonjeol in 2002.38 It is clear 
that Dangun has been the weapon for many political maneuvers by the DPRK to claim a kind of 
ideological superiority over the ROK.39 
 Dangun’s tomb is not the only example of the use of ancient tombs by the DPRK to cement 
national identity and build political legitimacy. Lankov describes the “discovery” of King 
Dongmyeong’s (58–19 BCE) tomb: “In the early 1970s, Kim Jong-il pointed to a major shortcoming 
of North Korean archaeology: archaeologists had failed to locate the tomb of King Tongmyong, one 
of Koguryo’s most remarkable leaders… Encouraged by the wise instructions of the Dear Leader, 
archaeologists immediately produced the required tomb which was duly ‘restored’ and became a 
tourist attraction…” (2007: 45).40 The reconstruction, like Dangun’s tomb, features an amalgam of 
anachronistic elements, although it was initially an authentic Goguryeo tomb (though not 
necessarily Dongmyeong’s) (Lankov 2007: 80; Portal 2005: 112–13). In December 2012, the DPRK 
                                                             
37 According to the report, which was headlined “5000 year-long history and homogeneity of the nation 
corroborated,” eighty-six bone fragments belonging to Dangun and his wife were found and dated to 5001 BP 
by electron paramagnetic resonance dating (Glover 2006: 22; Pai 2000: 60). 
38 “S. Koreans head North for festivity,” Korea Herald, October 2, 2002, LexisNexis Academic. 
39 For details on the South Korean response to North Korean appropriation of Dangun, see Pai 2000: 269–70. 
40 King Dongmyeong is an especially significant figure for Korean history; he is famous for extending the 
borders of Goguryeo far to the north into what is today China.  
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invited much ridicule from the Western press by claiming to have discovered a “unicorn lair,” which 
in fact was merely poorly translated by the (North) Korean Central News Agency.41 The alleged find 
was of the lair of the mythical Girin beast [기린, Chinese qílín 麒麟], associated with King 
Dongmyeong as his mount of choice.  
Yet another controversial find was the 1949 discovery of Anak Tomb No. 3, not far from 
Pyongyang, dated by inscriptions precisely to 347 CE. According to the tomb inscriptions, the 
occupant of the tomb was Dong Shou 冬壽, a general of the state of Former Yan 前燕 (337–370 CE), 
who fled to Korea (Im 1992: 240). Since 1959, the tenth anniversary of the tomb’s discovery and 
coinciding with the assertion of juche philosophy by the Kim Il-sung regime, the tomb was 
attributed to Goguryeo kings in an attempt to eliminate the site’s foreign connections. Non-DPRK 
scholars have noted that the tomb’s architecture is demonstrably Chinese, and comparable tombs 
exist in China (Portal 2005: 113; Erickson, Yi, and Nylan 2010: 141–44). The tomb of another 
important historical figure, Gija 箕子, who appears in Chinese texts as an eleventh-century BCE 
figure who migrated to Korea and ruled Gojoseon after Dangun, is understandably “dismissed by 
North Korean scholars as an invention during the colonial period” for its implications of Chinese 
influence on the development of Korea (Portal 2005: 109). 42 This tomb is not a modern 
reconstruction but possibly one established in 1102 CE in Pyongyang and subsequently relocated a 
number of times (Shim 2002: 276). Finally, the tomb of King Taejo of Goryeo (918–948 CE), who 
unified the Korean Peninsula during his reign, has been reconstructed and the site is marked by 
inscriptions of Kim Il-sung himself in archaizing style (Portal 2005: 116–17). The manipulations of 
tombs has clearly been central to the DPRK’s nationalistic archaeology program, particularly 
                                                             
41 “Lair of King Tongmyong’s Unicorn Reconfirmed in DPRK [고구려시조왕의 기린굴 재확인],” Korea Central 
News Agency, November 29, 2012, [URL]. 
42 Shim argues in his 2002 article that Gija’s supposed migration to the east is “an anachronistic fabrication,” 
an idea advanced by postcolonial Korean scholars for whom Gija represented the long sought-after link 
between prehistory and history. Under the Goryeo Kingdom, Gija was elevated to the status of a cultic figure 
for a number of possible reasons, including the desire of Goryeo intellectuals to associate more closely to 
China as a result of Mongol invasion and rule, and, following the establishment of Joseon, the popularity of 
Confucianism, to which Gija, being an ancient Chinese figure, was eminently linked (Shim 2002). See also 
Nelson 1995: 225–26 for further reading on Gija and the Chinese connection to Korean protohistory. 
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effective because North (and South) Korea are countries in which ancestors and ancestry forms a 
critical part of ethnonational identity. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS: CHINA’S NORHTEAST PROJECT AND THE FUTURE OF KOREAN ARCHAEOLOGY 
 
 Nowhere else in the world is history so relevant to present issues as in Northeast Asia. The 
presentation of the region’s history in Japanese textbooks has repeatedly soured relations between 
Japan and South Korea/China. Frequent territorial disputes cannot be easily explained solely in 
terms of modern economics and the procurement of valuable natural resources because history 
plays such an important role in the debate. Not only is historical data used to make arguments for 
and against the sovereignty of nations over particular pieces of territory, the element of national 
pride at stake is as important if not more so than the potential material gains that could accompany 
the seizure of land. The ongoing Dokdo/Takeshima conflict between Japan and South Korea, as well 
as the most recent Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute between China and Japan, are prime examples of the 
collision of nationalism, politics, and history in the same arena.  
 In North and South Korea, even more controversial than the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute was 
the five-year state-funded project launched in China in 2002, called the Serial Research Project on 
the History and Current State of the Northeast Borderland [东北边疆历史与现状系列研究工程 
동북병강사여현장계열연구공정], abbreviated the Northeast Project [东北工程 동북공정]. This 
project, which by some accounts had a budget of twenty billion yuan (three billion US dollars), was 
China’s attempt to claim Goguryeo history as its own and was not merely an academic issue but one 
with enormous political ramifications (Yoon 2004: 118). I am only able to briefly discuss the most 
salient of these due to the complexity of the topic. 
 China’s motivation for the Northeast Project was to promote the united multiethnic state 
theory laid out in its constitution in 1954.43 It was critical that China’s border provinces, largely 
                                                             
43 Tǒngyī de duōmínzúguójiā 统一的多民族国家论. Chinese archaeology is largely decentralized (provinces 
have their own archaeological institutes, publications, and have a great degree of autonomy), but regional 
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inhabited by ethnic minorities, associate more closely with the collective Chinese identity than that 
of neighboring countries or a distinct ethnic identity;44 the potential instability that could be caused 
in such an event has already been demonstrated in Tibet and Uighur Xinjiang (Yoon 2004: 99–
100).45 Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture, adjacent to North Korea, is one area prone to this same 
risk due to its population of approximately forty percent ethnic Koreans, the issue of North Korean 
refugees, and, unlike Tibet, the fact that Korea is a globally recognized sovereign nation. In 
launching the Northeast Project, China was attempting to limit Korean influence on the ethnic 
Korean community of northeast China (Yoon 2004: 100, 111). One way to achieve this aim was to 
claim that the history of the region (in which Goguryeo history is prominent) was not Korean but in 
fact belonged to the Chinese sphere. 
 The angry response from South Korea severely tested diplomatic ties between China and 
South Korea, especially given that Chinese historians had consistently written the history of the 
Goguryeo kingdom into the history of Korea’s Three Kingdoms up to the 1980s (Yoon 2004: 107, 
2005: 88). The same history was now being integrated by China into Chinese history: In 2004, the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs removed Goguryeo from a summary of Korean history on its 
website. To make matters worse, the ministry’s response to subsequent South Korean outrage was 
to remove pre-World War II Korean history from the website altogether, circumventing the 
problem but simultaneously (from the Korean point-of-view) deleting Korean identity (Gries 2005: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
archaeological projects do not strive to assert the historical independence or cultural individuality of the 
provinces. Rather, the purpose of regional archaeological projects is to claim a particular province’s historical 
importance and contributions to Chinese civilization (Von Falkenhausen 1995). 
44 A somewhat comparable example is Spain, where Spanish nationalism has been challenged by Basque, 
Catalonian, and Galician nationalisms. Spain has been conceived of as a single entity at least since the fifteenth 
century CE and in the mid-nineteenth century, efforts to build a single national history of Spain began. 
Interestingly, Spanish archaeology at present is largely depoliticized (Díaz-Andreu 1995). 
45 In light of these examples, China is aware that mishandling the issue of ethnic minorities could have 
significant consequences. Parts of Chinese history could easily be claimed by neighboring nations, for 
instance the history of the Yuan Dynasty by Mongolia and Nanyue/Baiyue history by Vietnam, and if this 
occurs, the whole of China’s extensive borders could experience instability. To prevent this, China has 
launched the Northwest Project 西北工程 and the Southwest Project 西南工程, less debated because the 
histories targeted by those projects are that of ethnic groups officially a part of China (Chinese state 
censorship is therefore able to regulate all discussion). Additionally, part of the underlying issue is economic; 
China’s rapid economic growth was not equally spread out so that the core provinces benefitted while border 
provinces fell behind (Yoon 2004: 111–12, 2005: 29–33).  
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3–4). Although sources for the DPRK ’s response are unavailable or inaccessible,46 Pyongyang was 
sure to have been irritated particularly by Beijing’s application in 2003 to UNESCO to make 
Goguryeo tombs located in present-day Chinese territory a Chinese World Heritage Site. Pyongyang 
had made the same application for Goguryeo tombs in North Korean territory two years prior.47 
China’s Northeast Project was such a critical issue, a threat to the existence of the Korean identity, 48 
that it prompted the first ever joint DPRK-ROK research project on Goguryeo tombs in 2005 (Gries 
2005: 3–4, 8).49 
 Territorial disputes are also implicit in the Northeast Project controversy (Nelson 1995: 
223).50 Korea considers the Gando Convention, signed by Japan and China in 1909 to acknowledge 
Chinese claim on the Gando territory at the border between China and Korea, null and void (Yoon 
2004). More symbolically significant is the rapid development of the northern half of Baekdu 
Mountain, under Chinese control, by China. Although, as we have seen, Baekdu Mountain is linked 
closely to and perceived together with the origins of Korea and, indeed, has historically been 
controlled by Korean states, an agreement between China and the DPRK in 1962 split the mountain 
roughly in half between the two states. China’s aggressive development of the region as well as its 
application to make the location a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2008, have tested Sino-Korean 
                                                             
46 Due to state censorship, the Northeast Project controversy was not covered extensively by Chinese media 
(Gries 2005: 12). 
47 In the end, UNESCO chose not to address the issue directly and granted both China and North Korea’s 
request in 2004 (Gries 2005: 3). 
48 The issue is especially sensitive for North Korea. Goguryeo’s territory at its height extended both north and 
south of the Yalu River. China therefore considers Goguryeo to have had Chinese roots (Choi, S. 2008: 170; 
Nelson 2006: 50). North Korea sees such expansion as exemplary of Korea’s historical strength and political 
independence (see the discussion on King Dongmyeong’s tomb, above). Goguryeo history is therefore central 
to the DPRK government, which, while it claims descent from Gojoseon and has produced some “evidence,” 
has concrete archaeological evidence from the Goguryeo period. The government’s legitimacy is built from 
such evidence and to cede that Goguryeo was in any way Chinese would utterly undermine it. For details on 
the interpretation of Goguryeo history by Chinese and Korean historians, see Kang, H. S. 2008: 23 ff. 
49 Further joint projects have been conducted since in North Korean archaeological sites, although these were 
limited in scope (see Kang, H. S. 2008: 20, 37). 
50 See Seretis 2005: 216 for a concise definition of the symbolic significance of territory to a national group 
and its role in the national-identity building process. 
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relations especially given Baekdu Mountain’s status in Korean consciousness as the birthplace of 
Korean civilization and an eminently Korean landscape.51  
 What lies in the future for Korean archaeology? Its importance to the state and the public is 
unlikely to diminish. If anything, the influence  of archaeology will only grow. Kohl and Fawcett note 
that “it is obvious that archaeology will continue to play a critical and inevitable role in the forging 
of national consciousness” (Kohl and Fawcett 1995: 13). Northeast Asia is still very much in flux, 
with China’s ever-increasing global dominance, North Korea’s political instability, and the possible 
prospect of Korean reunification. National identities will continue to change and archaeology will 
be called on to facilitate the process. In the midst of all the changes, Northeast Asia remains 
nonetheless deeply rooted in the past and the archaeology of Northeast Asian countries is still in 
many regards a rather “traditional” field despite significant advances in theory and methodology.  
Korean archaeology suffers from what Pai calls “invasion neurosis”: “Xenophobia, patriotic 
sentiments, and competing political agendas pose the greatest barrier to an objective and analytical 
study of Korean archaeology and ancient history today (1994: 45). On one hand, Nelson argues, a 
measure of responsibility should be placed on Western academia, which has, generally speaking, 
viewed Korea as somehow less significant than China and Japan (1993: 4). Yet, Koreans scholars 
themselves are responsible for defining the future of Korean archaeology. Choi Seong-rak stresses 
that Korean archaeology is its own field with its own needs, and so should carefully deliberate what 
it does and does not take from Western archaeology (2008). However, as long as Korean 
archaeology remains nationalistically-charged, it will be difficult for global academia to understand 
and participate in discourse.  
The most recent works produced in the West regarding the issue of archaeology ’s changing 
role in a world of nation-states suggest adaptive approaches. For instance, Holtorf presents a case 
for archaeology guided by public interests and needs: “If the past is now, not then, archaeologists 
need to change their focus: from telling stories about past realities told in the present to telling 
stories about present-day realities using the past merely as a reference point… Giving people the 
                                                             




past they want is to give archaeologists and heritage professionals the past they ought to study”  
(2013: 80). While I am not wholly in agreement with Holtorf’s position, his fundamental 
suggestions are thought-provoking: What is the function of the past if not to serve the present? But 
the example of Northeast Asia has shown that too much influence by modern issues on archaeology 
can be restrictive. Choi Mong-Lyong posits that the attempt to understand the cultures and history 
of Northeast Asia merely along the confines of politics is unproductive (2008: 67). Nelson echoes 
these views and adds that in Korea, despite ethnicity being particularly difficult to observe in the 
archaeological record, much effort focuses in ethnic studies nonetheless (1995: 231).  
One might ask whether China’s Northeast Project was an ultimately fruitful endeavor. Five 
years after its conclusion, it is still too early to evaluate the project ’s impact. In the political realm, 
the Northeast Project stirred up major controversy and stressed diplomatic relations between 
China and Korea. What has it accomplished in the academic realm? While the dialogue spurred by 
the controversy brought history to the forefront of national consciousness and additional funding 
for relevant research stimulated lively debates in academia, even prompting the DPRK and the ROK 
to collaborate on joint research, in the end, because all research was funded by the government 
(coupled with, in China’s case, state censorship), Chinese scholars were unable to advance original 
positions if those contradicted the government’s stance. Similarly, in South and North Korea, the 
government controls all archaeological funding (Pai 2000: 13), so that it is worth questioning 
whether the Northeast Project actually contributed in producing new knowledge. It  is a great 
shame, Nelson notes, using the following example: Energies directed toward the question of 
ethnogenesis has placed Korea in a position in which it can truly contribute to the field of ethnic 
studies worldwide, if only it can disregard the nationalistically inspired and mandated notions of 
time immemorial Korean ethnicity (1995: 230–31). 
Paradoxically, the nationalistic needs of modern nations to discover in the past the 
necessary backing to construct modern identities that has fueled archaeological research for 
decades and engendered the great potential of Northeast Asian archaeology, is simultaneously 
hindering the realization of this very same potential. At present, Northeast Asia is a battleground in 
which the “past is subjugated and harnessed in order to create the social order of the present”  
26 
 
(Yoffee 2007: 1); “accounts of the past are sent into battle, much as people are” (Alcock 2002: 17). 
The real casualty of this battle may well be a future of friendly political relations, cooperative 
scholarly research, and the generation of new knowledge for the benefit of global academia, as each 
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